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Ten years ago, in the midst of the political flux engendered by Presi-
dent Nixon's resignation and pardon, the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit under Section Two of the Sher-
man Act challenging American Telephone and Telegraph Company's
(AT&T) regulated monopoly. The Division's complaint contended, essen-
tially, that through manipulation of interrelated "bottlenecks," AT&T
had unlawfully monopolized the provision of telephone equipment and
long-distance services.1 This extraordinary antitrust litigation against a
regulated company advanced inexorably, spanning four Congresses, three
Presidents, and two U.S. district court judges.
On January 1, 1984, AT&T formally divested its local Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs), pursuant to a consent decree ending the government
antitrust suit.' At the time of divestiture most antitrust and telephone in-
dustry experts predicted that divestiture would prove to be in the "public
interest,"' but few would now claim that divestiture has benefited the
public thus far."
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1. See MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on
Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MacAvoy & Robinson I].
2. The two principal published court rulings regarding the AT&T settlement are: United States
v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (text of the decree), afi'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); and United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057
(D.D.C. 1983) (approving the plan of reorganization). In addition, there are a number of supplemen-
tal rulings in Western Electric by the judgment court published at 578 F. Supp. 662 (foreign ex-
change offerings), 578 F. Supp. 643 (mobile radio services), 578 F. Supp. 653 (tariff filings), 578 F.
Supp. 668 (routing), 578 F. Supp. 677 (third party intervention), and 578 F. Supp. 680 (federal
contracting).
3. See, e.g., Grant, Through a Glass Brightly: Consumers and the New Tomorrow, in DISCON-
NECTING BELL: THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T DIVESTITURE 132 (H. Shooshan ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as DISCONNECTING BELL].
4. According to a November 1984 national survey conducted by Louis Harris & Assoc., Inc., 64%
of the 1247 adults surveyed thought the AT&T breakup was a bad idea, compared to 25% of those
surveyed who thought it was a good idea. Jackson, Business Week/Harris Poll: The Public Sees the
Little Guy as the Loser, BUS. WK., Dec. 3, 1984, at 89.
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On the eve of divestiture, we published an article which assessed the
principal legal and economic rationales for the AT&T settlement and ad-
vanced several predictions about the state of the post-divestiture telephone
industry.' We predicted that the new AT&T, through its substantial scale
economies, would gain unregulated monopoly power over the supposedly
competitive long-distance service market-at least if the company's princi-
pal reason for accepting divestiture was to be realized. We also predicted
that without profit transfers ("settlements") from Long Lines, local tele-
phone rates would increase and service quality would decline as the local
companies struggled to cover their costs. In effect, we viewed the settle-
ment as a "win" for AT&T, if it enabled AT&T to escape the increasing
burden of financing the over-regulated local exchange system while retain-
ing its highly profitable long-distance service and equipment operations.
Consumers, we argued, would not benefit from divestiture, because they
would end up paying both higher prices for local service and the same or
higher prices for long-distance service.
More than a year into divestiture, it appears that both consumers and
AT&T are worse off. In this article we explain why some of the predic-
tions made in our first article have not come to pass. We argue that di-
vestiture has not turned out as initially expected because of limitations
inherent in the judicial process through which the settlement and its un-
derlying policies were determined. The settlement was a private agree-
ment between the Justice Department and AT&T. Public proceedings
followed the announcement of the settlement, and with limited revisions
the district court approved the divestiture plan.' Thus, a radical restruc-
turing of the telecommunications industry was achieved' without the full
participation of all parties concerned with the outcome. No one group,
and certainly not the judgment court, had the power to control all aspects
of the telecommunications industry and to ensure that its goals of divesti-
ture were achieved. Since neither the legislative nor executive branch of
the federal government fully participated in the formulation of the divesti-
ture plan, institutional support for the goals of divestiture has been weak.
Even had the process of divestiture worked smoothly, the goals of di-
vestiture could not easily have been accomplished. AT&T and the Justice
Department hoped to achieve two related goals through divestiture: the
5. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1.
6. See supra note 2.
7. For descriptions of the restructured industry, see Besen & Woodbury, Regulation, Deregula-
tion, and Antitrust in the Telecommunications Industry, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 39 (1983); Lavey &
Carlton, Economic Goals and Remedies of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment, 71 CEO. L.J. 1497
(1983); Trienens, Vertical Integration: Should the AT&T Doctrine Be Extended?-The Telecommu-
nications Industry, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 259 (1983).
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development of marginal cost-based pricing,8 and the creation of effective
competition in long-distance (toll) markets, thus facilitating reduced regu-
lation of AT&T's long-distance operations.9 Achieving these goals would
require pricing local telephone service at much higher levels, to cover op-
erating and common capital costs, a result which neither regulators nor
Congress has been willing to permit.' ° Instead, local rates continue to be
subsidized while BOC revenue requirements are supplemented by non-
cost-based access charges levied on AT&T and the Other Common Carri-
ers (OCCs)." The carrier access charges do not represent a stable solution
to the BOCs' revenue needs because AT&T and the OCCs can "bypass"
the local exchange networks and avoid these charges. 2 AT&T has partic-
ularly strong incentives to seek cheaper alternatives to the BOC networks
because it pays significantly higher charges for interconnection than the
OCCs. Furthermore, in the market for long-distance service effective com-
petition has not developed. The continued regulation of AT&T and re-
strictions which prevent the BOCs from entering this market have shel-
tered the OCCs from competition. Thus, the price reductions and
technological innovations that should accompany increased competition for
long-distance service have yet to materialize.
In Section I of the article we discuss the revenue transfers among tele-
phone services which existed prior to divestiture and outline the terms of
the settlement between AT&T and the government. Section II discusses
developments in the first year of divestiture, and describes those areas in
which the settlement has failed to satisfy the objectives of interested par-
ties. Section III identifies a set of goals which we argue should be the
focus of the post-divestiture telecommunications policy. Although it is per-
haps premature to judge the success or failure of divestiture just one year
into the process, we believe corrections are necessary to prevent a bad
situation from further deteriorating.
8. On the efficiency of marginal cost pricing, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 435-36 (10th ed.
1976). See also Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 140-
41 (1984) (discussing cost-based pricing for telephone services).
9. See, e.g., The AT&T Settlement: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1982) (testimony of William F. Baxter, Assis-
tant Attorney General for Antitrust) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELE-
GRAPH CO., 1983 ANNUAL REP. 12-13 (1984).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66 & 88.
11. The OCCs include MCI, GTE/Sprint, ITT Longer Distance, US Tel/All America, and
ALLNET. See R. Davidson, Telecommunications in Transition 31 (1984) (Harvard Bus. School
Case Study no. 0-384-207).
12. See infra note 83.
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I. Traditional Telephone Industry Pricing and the AT&T Settlement
A. Pricing
Prior to divestiture AT&T and the telephone industry functioned under
a regulated pricing scheme which did not reflect marginal cost." Long-
distance service was priced substantially above cost in order to subsidize
local rates.' Since the 1950's, regulators have divided the U.S. telephone
system into two spheres of operation: (1) long-distance toll operations, for
decades dominated by AT&T-and more recently joined by a fringe of
specialized or competitive common carriers; and (2) local exchange opera-
tions, dominated by the monopoly franchise of the AT&T operating com-
panies.' 5 Long-distance operations have long been characterized by cost-
reducing technology, leading to substantial profitability when rates are
held constant. 6 Local exchange operations, on the other hand, have been
characterized by cost increases, due in part to the labor intensiveness of
the operations and a relatively stable technology.' 7 These cost increases
coupled with price controls have led to low, indeed, often nonexistent
profitability. One of the primary roles of regulation was to direct increas-
ing cash flows from toll service to the local operating companies to cover
the joint and common capital costs of both toll and basic exchange ser-
vices. By supplementing local revenues in this manner it was possible to
sustain low local rates.
The effects of this system of revenue shifting were substantial. Thirty
years ago long-distance operations bore a share of common capital costs
roughly comparable to their relative use of local telephone plant. Inter-
state telephone calling then covered three percent of common costs and
accounted for about three percent of total message traffic. 8 In more recent
years, the long-distance cost assessment has escalated in order to provide
13. The telephone industry recovered much of the cost of providing access to the telephone net-
work through charges based on use, even though connection costs remain independent of the amount
of use and additional use entails low marginal costs. Marginal cost pricing would charge subscribers a
two-part tariff separating the incremental costs of providing access to the network for one additional.
subscriber from the marginal cost of additional use by that subscriber. See Kahn, supra note 8, at 140-
41.
14. Under the settlements process, transfers of net income from Long Lines were used to cover
local and joint local-long-distance costs, thereby keeping local rates low.
15. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE CHANGING TELEPHONE INDUSTRY: ACCESS
CHARGES, UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND LOCAL RATES 9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CBO STUDY].
16. See generally Wiley, The End of Monopoly: Regulatory Change and the Promotion of Com-
petition, in DISCONNECTING BELL, supra note 3, at 23, 25 (discussing technological advances in tele-
communications service).
17. See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 6 ("The local loop ... retains much the same technology
as it has for 100 years-copper wire physically connecting customer equipment with the central
office").
18. Id. at 10 (numbers estimated from chart).
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cash flows necessary to keep local telephone rates low.19 In 1983, the av-
erage monthly price charged for local residential telephone service was
approximately eleven dollars. 0 The average monthly cost, including joint
and common capital costs, of providing this service was about twenty-six
dollars.21 The revenues needed to defray the fifteen dollar per month
shortfall came from profits on inter- and intrastate tolls, business services
such as private lines, equipment leasing, and other activities.2" The prime
beneficiaries of this pricing policy were residential telephone customers
who made few toll calls.2" In addition to these inter-service and interper-
sonal transfers, substantial inter-regional transfers also occurred. Phone
customers in the Northeastern states, for example, contributed substantial
amounts through their relatively high toll bills to maintain relatively low
local rates in both high-cost rural and fast-growing "Sunbelt"
communities.2 '
Long-distance rates, particularly interstate rates regulated by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC)," have remained almost con-
stant while the cost of providing long-distance service has declined signifi-
cantly.2 Not only did the FCC and state regulators allow toll rates to
remain constant as costs declined, so that profit margins widened, but
these agencies also blocked competitive entry into the long-distance field
19. In 1981 interstate telephone calling covered 26% of subscriber plant costs but accounted for
only 8% of total message traffic. Id. at 9.
20. COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANALYSIS OF THE EF-
FECTS OF FEDERAL DECISIONS ON LOCAL TELEPHONE SERVICE, attachment 14 (Dec. 9, 1983).
21. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 13 (the $26 figure represents an FCC estimate of the 1981
monthly average fixed cost per subscriber).
22. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).
23. Residential long-distance usage is quite concentrated. According to one published study, 83.9%
of total residential customers in 1977 had monthly interstate long distance bills of $10 or less. See
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOM., CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS INDUSTRY 89 (Comm. Print 1981).
24.
Substantial interregional revenue transfers result . . . from mismatches between separations-
based cost allocations to the interstate revenue requirement and subscriber toll contributions to
the revenue pool. . . . [I]n 1982 for every dollar contributed to the [interstate] toll pool, Con-
necticut, [the] District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Tennessee, New Jersey,
Delaware, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Hawaii received about 50.75 (plus or minus $0.10). Geor-
gia, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and New York roughly broke even. Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming all
drew in excess of $1.25.
LEHMAN BROTHERS, THE BELL EXCHANGE 9 (1984). See also H.R. REP. NO. 479, supra note 22, at
113-14 (minority views) (discussing the amount of interstate subsidy); 129 CONG. REC. H9265 (daily
ed. Nov. 7, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Corcoran); Baseman, Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in
Regulated Markets, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 357 (G. Fromm ed. 1981).
25. Under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1982), the FCC is charged
with setting interstate rates. Intrastate rates remain the province of state regulatory agencies. See 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1982).
26. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 6, 8.
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until 1977. As a result, market forces could not operate to lower toll
charges to levels approximating marginal costs.2" During this period, state
regulators limited increases in local telephone rates to small annual per-
centages. Because the cost of providing local service was rising faster than
the rates charged for the service, the profitability of local operations dwin-
dled, so that the long-distance revenue transfers became essential.
Keeping local telephone rates at artificially low levels benefited both
AT&T and the state regulatory agencies. Because the settlements that the
local companies received were tied to the amount of local investment, these
companies were provided with an incentive for capital investment. With
increased local investments, AT&T was able to justify increases in long-
distance profit margins, due to formulas used to calculate AT&T's reve-
nue contributions to local operations."8 Low local telephone rates maxi-
mized telephone penetration and increased the volume and profitability of
long-distance calls.2" Regulators were able to demonstrate to their political
constituencies the positive consequences of regulation, namely, low prices
and universal service.
Permissive, if not explicitly mandated, monopoly pricing of long-
distance service was a critical factor in maintaining this pricing system.
When confronted with local revenue shortfalls, regulators allowed AT&T
to cover such shortfalls with cash flows generated from monopoly-level
profit margins on toll and related services.
This pricing system began to crack under substantial economic and po-
litical pressure."0 The demonstrated high profit margin on toll service at-
27. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 296-98 (1982); Knieps & Spiller, Regulation
by Partial Deregulation: The Case of Telecommunications, 35 AD. L. REV. 391, 395 (1983).
28. Local operating companies divided their costs between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions
under a system of "separations and settlements." The allocation of costs was made in accordance with
the FCC Separations Manual (Part 67 of the FCC rules). A Subscriber Plant Factor (SPF) was used
on a state-by-state basis to allocate plant costs. The SPFs represented multiples of the factors measur-
ing the relative interstate use of local plant. Costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction were recover-
able through tolls on interstate services. See The Federal-State Joint Board and the Jurisdictional
Separations Proceeding, FCC NEWS, Apr. 15, 1983, at 1, 4. See also CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at
9-10.
29. In 1934, telephone service was available only in one out of every three households. By 1970,
91% of U.S. households had service and, by 1984, about 98% of households had at least one telephone.
R. Salaman, The Price of Residential Telephone Service 1 (May 25, 1984) (National Telecommuni-
cations and Information Administration Staff Paper on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
For discussions of the benefits of traditional telephone industry pricing policies, see Trebing, Com-
mon Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 1969 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299; Gabel, The Early
Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920, 1969 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340.
30. For the history of competitive entry into the long-distance and equipment fields, see Note,
Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: AT&T Restrictions and FCC Regula-
tions, 61 VA. L. REV. 679 (1975); Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond
Telerent, 86 YALE L.J. 538 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Competition]; Comment, Intercity Tele-
communications Competition After Execunet, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 117 (1978); Wiley, The End of
Monopoly: Regulatory Change and the Promotion of Competition, in DISCONNECTING BELL, supra
note 3, at 23.
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tracted competitors, first on the fringe (private lines only) and then at the
core of the long-distance market. The FCC tried to keep competitors out
by issuing only limited service licenses. This regulatory policy gave way
when the courts subsequently overturned these administrative limits on
licensing."1 The OCCs, when freed from regulatory restrictions, offered
services at prices low enough to capture market share from AT&T,"2 thus
inviting a competitive response from AT&T. Contemporaneously, the
FCC authorized competition in the telephone equipment market; this also
undermined the industry's traditional pricing system."3
AT&T resisted these competitive inroads not only by seeking to cut
long-distance rates,3 4 but also by refusing to provide equal local exchange
interconnections to the OCCs. 5 AT&T also sought to contain competition
in the equipment markets.3 6 The Antitrust Division assumed that the
problems encountered by the new vendors of service and equipment were
the inevitable consequence of AT&T's dominant position in the inter-
related long-distance, local service, and equipment markets, coupled with
the firm's incentive and ability to manipulate these markets to exclude or
limit competition."7 The Antitrust Division failed to recognize that opposi-
tion to competitive entry was not limited to AT&T. For example, local
telephone companies owned by GTE Service Corp. and others, which had
virtually no toll operations, refused to provide local interconnections in
much the same fashion." Almost all of the 1500 very small independent
31. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1040 (1978). This is not to suggest, however, that the pre-divestiture price structure maximized profit
for AT&T. Indeed, because downward elasticities were lower on local service, the maximum profit on
the price-cost margins should have been larger on local service than on long-distance service.
32. See infra text accompanying note 98.
33. See In re Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tele-
phone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), modi-
fied, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976). See generally Fuhr, Competition in the Terminal Equipment Market
After Carterfone, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 669 (1983); Note, Competition, supra note 30.
34. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 6 (chart indicating that the price charged by
AT&T for a long-distance call decreased in 1975 and 1977). AT&T reacted to OCC competition in
the private line market by seeking lower de-averaged tariffs for high-density areas. Id. at 15-16 (dis-
cussing AT&T's Hi/Low tariff proposal). See also Wiley, supra note 30, at 33-34.
AT&T's proposed and implemented price reductions prompted significant private antitrust litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Com. Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 968, 968-69 (D.D;C. 1983), alfd,
740 F.2d 1081, 1105 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1984).
35. For example, Bell had a "customer premises" requirement that allowed the hook-up of a long
distance competitor only if the hook-up occurred within the confines of the customer's premises,
thereby preventing competitors from using local networks in the operation of their systems. United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 1354-57. In general, according to the DOJ, intercity competitors
experienced delays, poor service, and poor maintenance in obtaining interconnection from local oper-
ating companies.
36. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 14-15.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. GTE Corp., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,354 at 64,756 n.23
(D.D.C. 1984) (alleged denial of equal access); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465, 476 (7th
Cir. 1984) (alleged hobbling of equipment competitors)
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telephone companies similarly resisted long-distance competition, although
they had neither equipment manufacturing nor toll operations.89
Financial incentives, rather than anti-competitive schemes, explain this
resistance. In response to the diminished cash transfer to local companies
resulting from long-distance competition, the regulatory authorities im-
posed "access" charges on the OCCs for connections to Bell's local ex-
change system. But by regulatory fiat, the access charges paid by the
OCCs were only a fraction of the settlements paid by AT&T Long Lines.
Until 1984, the leading competitive carrier, MCI, paid only about $235
per local line per month; AT&T paid settlements on average of $600 per
line per month. 40 Understandably, local telephone companies preferred to
deal with AT&T because they received more money to cover local revenue
shortfalls.
Competition in long-distance service posed a serious threat to the tradi-
tional pricing of telephone services. New entrants, with an increasing
market share, did not have the same regulatory obligation to help subsi-
dize local rates. AT&T's declining market share meant that the subsidy
available to local companies would decline. While the traditional regula-
tory apparatus remained, the cash transfers on which it was based were in
jeopardy.
By 1980, a strictly regulated AT&T, confronted with competitive pres-
sures, responsible under regulation for subsidizing local service, and be-
sieged by a hostile Justice Department, was prepared to accept the risks
of the open market without the operating companies and their regulatory
baggage. The company apparently believed that its future under divesti-
ture would be much brighter than under the traditional, but crumbling,
system of regulation.
B. The Settlement
After protracted negotiations, AT&T and the Department of Justice
reached a settlement on January 8, 1982.41 Under its terms, AT&T re-
tained much of its nationwide long-distance telephone network; its equip-
39. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 768 (1982) (testimony of Richard A. Lumpkin, U.S. Independent Telephone
Association) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Amendments to Communications Act of 1934:
Hearings on S.611 and S.622 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 425 (1979) (statement of
Carlton Appelo, Organization for the Protection and Advancement of Small Telephone Companies).
40. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir.
1984); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 712 F.2d 517, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also R.
Davidson, AT&T and the Access Charge 7-8 (1984) (Harvard Bus. School Study No. 0-384-208).
41. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
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ment manufacturing and supply arm, the Western Electric Co.; and its
world-renowned research affiliate, Bell Laboratories. 42 The agreement
lifted the limits on the scope of AT&T's retail operations imposed by a
1956 consent decree.'" The company thus was free to diversify into data
processing and other new fields. 44 AT&T was required, however, to divest
itself of its local telephone exchange companies, the BOCs, which ac-
counted for about three-quarters of AT&T's assets, but contributed less
than half the unified company's profits.' The BOCs were directed to
commence a costly plant modernization and upgrading program which
was to be completed by 1986."' The goal of this program was to ensure
that all long-distance carriers would enjoy what came to be known as
"equal interconnection," i.e., physically equivalent connection to local
telephone company subscribers.47 The decree also restricted BOC opera-
tions, by permitting them to provide only local exchange telephone
services. 8
Prior to approving the agreement between AT&T and the Justice De-
partment, the trial court conducted review proceedings on the proposed
settlement under the Tunney Act."' U.S. District Judge Harold H.
Greene, the judge of record throughout the latter stages of the litigation,
entertained comments from a myriad of concerned parties.50 The testi-
mony of these parties and the judge's own concerns led him to consider
possible changes to the proposed settlement.
Judge Greene ultimately ordered four significant modifications in the
proposed settlement. First, over the objections of both AT&T and Justice,
the court approved BOC participation in the business of marketing and
42. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 173-74, 222-25.
43. See United States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Gas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
See, e.g., IBM v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452, 454 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that 1956 decree apparently
does not permit AT&T to offer data processing services through its subsidiaries); National Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 637 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976); GTE Serv. Corp. v.
FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Wiegner, Prometheus Unbound and Seeking
His Footing: AT&T's Move Into Computers, FORBES, Mar. 12, 1984, at 141 (discussing the chal-
lenge the new AT&T presents to IBM); Chu, Corporation Planning: From Shadow to Substance,
1983 BELL TELEPHONE MAG., No. 2, at 14 (1983).
44. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 179-80.
45. MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 19-21.
46. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 141-43, 160.
47. Id. at 228. See also Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by
Other Common Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413, 48 F.C.C.2d 676 (1974), afi'd sub nom. Bell Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 1026 (1975).
48. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 188-89.
49. This act requires an affirmative finding of "public interest" before entering a consent decree
in a government antitrust case. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16b-
16h (1980). See also Carr, Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 958
(1983).
50. The parties who were represented before Judge Greene, in. addition to the plaintiff and defen-
dants, are listed in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 134.
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installing telephone equipment."' Second, the court ordered AT&T to re-
linquish the lucrative Yellow Pages operation to the BOCs.55 Third, the
court adjusted the lines of demarcation initially drawn between "natural
monopoly" local functions and ostensibly competitive long-distance opera-
tions. Through this realignment, the court shifted to the BOCs about one-
fourth of the long-distance operations and associated revenues originally
slated to remain with AT&T.58 Fourth, the court imposed a seven-year
ban on AT&T's participation in the "electronic publishing" field, and
barred the BOCs from entering this field altogether. 4 A revised plan of
reorganization embodying these changes was developed by Justice and
AT&T and approved by the court in August 1983." 5
It is still. too early to determine the full impact of Judge Greene's revi-
sions. Three of his four modifications were aimed at increasing BOC reve-
nues by expanding their permissible activities within the traditional
boundaries of basic exchange service. The fourth revision was narrowly
focused on protecting the nascent electronic publishing industry from com-
petition. Judge Greene's prescriptions imply that the supposedly monopo-
lized local exchange operations require additional revenue sources to make
up for lost revenue transfers from the long-distance market. However,
substantial restrictions on the permissible activities of the BOCs remain
51. The BOCs are still not permitted to manufacture telephone equipment. Id. at 190-93.
52. Id. at 188-91, 193-94. In contemporaneous congressional hearings, a number of state regula-
tory commissioners testified that Yellow Pages profits contributed $73M, $57M, $62M, $35M, and
$21.4 million to support local rates in New York, New Jersey, Missouri, Massachusetts, and Ver-
mont, respectively. One study estimates that Yellow Pages contributed $2 billion annually nationwide
in revenues generally used to defray the joint and common costs of basic exchange service. See House
Hearings, supra note 39, pt. 1, at 126 (testimony of Edward Burke, President, National Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs); id. at 855-57 (testimony of state commissioners Gioia, Barbour, Dority,
and McCarren).
53. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 31-33. AT&T's pre- and post-divestiture mar-
ket share can be computed in a variety of ways. Domestic toll telephone revenues totalled $43.5 billion
in 1982, of which $26.7 billion (61%) is attributable to AT&T on a post-divestiture basis, declining
from 75% pre-divestiture. Domestic toll revenues include revenues from inter- and intrastate MTS,
WATS, and private line services provided to the public by common carriers and the revenue
equivalent of the use of private microwave systems. This figure also includes 1982 toll revenues of the
independent telephone companies ($7.6 billion), the Bell Operating Companies ($6.1 billion), the
competitive carriers ($2.4 billion), and the value of private microwave services ($660 million).
AT&T's post-divestiture share of minutes of use of public switched network services has been calcu-
lated at about 58%. See Comments of AT&T at 51-53, In re Long-Run Regulation of AT&T's Basic
Domestic Interstate Services, FCC Docket No. 83-1147 (filed Apr. 2, 1984). AT&T in 1982 esti-
mated that "approximately half of the intra-state long-distance traffic will remain with the BOCs."
Department of Justice Oversight: U.S. v. AT&T (The Effect on Local Rates): Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 177 (1982) (written responses of
AT&T to committee inquiries). Traditionally, inter- and intrastate toll revenues have been roughly
equal. Our estimate, therefore, is that about one-fourth of pre-divestiture AT&T's long-distance traf-
fic was transfered to the BOCs as a result of divestiture.
54. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 180-86. See generally Robinson, Public Information and 'Electronic
Publishing' Services, 32 ANNENBERG J. COM. 103 (1982).
55. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 990, 1057.
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after divestiture. In Section III we argue that such restrictions should be
lifted so that BOCs can develop the additional sources of revenue neces-
sary to stabilize local rates.
II. Divestiture and Its Immediate Aftermath
The AT&T break-up brought with it a host of undesirable conse-
quences. In this section we examine the effects of the divestiture on the
price and quality of service provided to telephone customers. We then ex-
amine the present condition of four major actors 56-AT&T, the BOCs,
the Justice Department, and the public-and compare their fortunes to
those predicted at the outset had divestiture worked as AT&T and Justice
designed it.
A. Effects on Price and Service
Divestiture yielded not only a scaled down AT&T, with some 370,000
employees and approximately $33 billion in 1984 revenues, but also seven
regional holding companies (the BOCs), each with about 100,000 employ-
ees and about $10 billion in projected revenues."' The BOCs were vested
with ownership of twenty-two telephone operating companies, which pro-
vide local telephone service to about eighty-five percent of American resi-
dents." In addition, a new "central services organization," subsequently
named Bell Communications Research, was created and charged with
providing the regional companies with a variety of technical and defense-
related services."
Proponents of divestiture claimed that it would eliminate "bottlenecks"
previously manipulated by AT&T to reduce toll competition and would
produce more efficient long-distance pricing and maintain low local tele-
phone rates.60 Ensuing efficiency gains were supposed to ensure that long-
56. Obviously, other groups, such as the FCC and the state regulatory agencies, are also major
actors. We do not discuss these groups here, however, because their interests in the decree, while
substantial, are secondary to those of the groups we examine.
57. AT&T Press Release, Jan. 28, 1985 (AT&T employees and revenues); MacAvoy & Robin-
son I, supra note 1, at 20 (BOC employees); STANDARD & POOR'S STOCK REPORTS: NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, Jan. 1985, at 184T, 311, 314, 1706T, 1744T, 2077U, 2362 (BOC revenues).
58. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 3 n.7.
59. Id. at 20. See also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1984 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 46-3; 1985
U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 31-4 (AT&T will also provide some of these services until 1987).
60. See Department of Justice Oversight: U.S. v. AT&T Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 68, 133-34 (1982) (testimony of William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and testimony of Morris Tanenbaum, AT&T Exec-
utive Vice-President); The Proposed Antitrust Settlement of US. v. AT&T: Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, and the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (testimony of Charles L. Brown, AT&T
Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]; Hearings, supra note 9, pt. 1, at 7 (testimony of
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distance rates would be more closely aligned with the economically opti-
mal marginal cost of providing such service. The discriminatorily high
charges AT&T must pay for local access have inhibited the development
of competition in the long-distance market. Virtually the only price reduc-
tion in long-distance service in the first year of divestiture-a 6.1% across
the board cut in interstate rates-came about as a result of FCC, not
market, action. 1 Furthermore, any major reduction in the price of toll
service would mean a significant loss of revenues that had been diverted
toward covering joint toll and local exchange costs. This loss would have
required local service price increases for a large number of residential and
rural telephone subscribers.
Pending court approval of the reorganization plan, the BOCs filed an
unprecedented $10.8 billion in local rate increase requests with state pub-
lic utility commissions nationwide (see Table 1). The companies rational-
ized these requests as necessary to lower revenue shortfalls caused by di-
vestiture.6" In fact, the companies had other reasons for the requests, such
as the adoption of accelerated depreciation practices authorized earlier by
the FCC. 8 Divestiture, however, provided the BOCs with a pretext for
phasing in these changes and justifying them to the regulators and the
public. As a consequence of this approach, the public and most Congress-
men came to believe all subsequent price increases for local telephone ser-
vices were caused by divestiture.64
Charles L. Brown, AT&T Chairman).
61. Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Phase I, FCC Docket No. 83-1145
(Nov. 8, 1984); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Phase I, FCC Docket No. 78-72 (Aug. 22,
1983).
62. See K. GORDON & J. HARING, THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER TELEPHONE PRICES ON UNIVERSAL
SERVICE 61 (1984) (FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper).
63. See Amendment of Part 31, 89 F.C.C.2d 1094 (1982), reconsid., 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983),
attd sub nor. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984); Effects of Fed-
eral Decisions on Local Telephone Service, 55 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 1 295 (1983); K. GORDON & J.
HARING, supra note 62, at 22-23.
64. Cf. Schwartz, It's a Bird, It's a Plane-No, a Phone Bill, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at A23.
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Table 1
Pending Telephone Rate Cases in Ten Populous States
Amount Requested
To be paid from
Local Carrier Access
To be paid from
Local Customer
State (Billions of S) Share (%) Charges (%) Acc. Charges (%)
California 2.915 26.90* 39.40 11.40
New York 1.299 39.15 n/a n/a
Texas 1.371 n/a 49.20 12.30
Pennsylvania .379 62.10* 51.60 0.00
Illinois .312 69.14* n/a n/a
Ohio .305 80.89* 0.00 41.30
Florida .259 n/a 74.20 25.80
Michigan .212 76.42* 86.00 14.00
New Jersey .090 60.00 n/a n/a









used to calculate this figure include only the flat rate portion of basic residential
n/a not available
Source: COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANALYSIS OF THE EF-
FECTS OF FEDERAL DECISIONS ON LOCAL TELEPHONE SERVICE - (A REPORT AFTER INQUIRY
IN CC DOCKET 83-788) Attachment 7 (1983).
The local telephone companies sought to recover a majority of these
revenues by imposing new access charges on the long-distance carriers and
individual subscribers for use of the basic exchange system. As Table 1
shows, about $7.3 billion in rate increases were sought in the largest
states. Of this amount, forty-one percent was to come from higher local
telephone rates, and fifty-nine percent was to be derived from access
charges, levied both on toll carriers and on individual phone customers.
In many states, regulators added to the companies' proposed increases
in carrier access charges. The states analyzed in Table 2 granted on aver-
age 103.9% of the original rate increase requests. The same regulators
who approved increased carrier access charges totally rejected all nine re-
quests for the imposition of local end-user access charges. Table 3 shows,
moreover, that state regulatory commissions granted only slightly more
than half of the requests for higher local telephone rates, allowing on av-
erage fifty-three percent of the requested rate increase.
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Table 2
Telephone Company Requests for Increases in Access Charges
Carrier End User



















































































Average 103.90[105.61 ]d 0 .O0[0.00]d
anumbers in brackets are amended requests.
bpending permanent approval.
Coriginally granted 100.00%, then rescinded entirely.
dincluding amended requests
n/r not requested
PUC = Public Utility Commission
RHC = Regional Holding Company
Source: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION AGENCY, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF STATE TELEPHONE REGULATORY DATA table B (1984).
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Table 3
General Rate Requests, as Submitted to State Regulatory Agencies
Date Percentage Percentage
of initial of amended
State request awarded request awarded
Alabama 10/83 64.95 n/amd
1/84 18.69 25.64
Arkansas 3/83 4 1.84*a 53.28
*b
California 7/83 67.42 n/amd
Colorado 11/83 16.56 39.24
Florida 11/82 34.72 40.23
Illinois 8/83 37.34 48.23
Massachusetts none n/r n/r
Michigan 11/82 40.32 n/amd
Nevada 1/84 pndg. n/amd
New York 8/83 36.13 48.10
North Carolina 1/84 pndg. n/amd
(PUC) 63.12 41.75c
Ohio 3/83 62.85 63.27
(RHC)
Tennessee 7/83 14.02 29.92
Texas 6/83 47.87* 61.87*
Vermont 1/84 pndg. n/amd
Virginia 8/83 85.31* 93.60*
Washington 5/82 50.42 n/amd
West Virginia 8/83 63.44* 68.00*
Wisconsin 8/83 54.32*d 54.65
*d
Wyoming 2/84 pndg. n/amd
Average 47.02* 51.37*
Average without identifiable
access charges and awards 46.55* 53.38*
Average including original
unamended requests 52.41*
Above without access charges
and awards 53.94*
*includes some access charges.
aincludes $11 million the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered the PSC to award for depreciation expenses
(otherwise, the award would have been 33.87%).
bincludes the $11 million in a above.
Cincludes $125.7 million request for end user access charges.
dinterim award
n/r not requested PUC = Public Utilities Commission
n/amd not amended RHC = Regional Holding Company
pndg. case still pending.
Source: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION AGENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF STATE TELEPHONE REGULATORY DATA, table A
(1984).
In ten of the largest states, residential monthly rates for unlimited local
calling service increased an average of thirteen percent for urban custom-
ers and twenty-one percent for rural customers (see Table 4). Business
customers faced slightly larger rate increases on the same class of service
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in both urban and rural areas (see Table 5). Increases of this magnitude,
however, were inadequate to cover both the direct costs of local service
and the common costs of local and long-distance service previously paid by
transfer payments from long-distance revenues in the integrated Bell Sys-
tem. Basic telephone service rates would have had to increase by up to
twenty-five percent over the three years following divestiture to compen-
sate for the loss of the long-distance subsidy caused by divestiture. 5
65. The Office of Policy Analysis and Development of the U.S. Department of Commerce Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration developed a model on which the following
analysis was performed. The difference between two scenarios depicting the post-divestiture and pre-
divestiture structures was simulated by phasing out the Subscriber Plant Factor (SPF) method of non-
traffic sensitive cost allocation (which was approximately 24% of these costs) in place before divesti-
ture and by not replacing that payment to local companies, causing them to raise local rates. The
results were as follows:
Increase in the 1981 Revenue
Year Requirement per local subscribers
1982 Exchange (%) 5.80
Exchange (S/month) 1.35
Interexchange Non-traffic Sensitive (S/month) -1.35
1983 Exchange (%) 18.50
Exchange (S/month) 4.31
Interexchange Non-traffic Sensitive (S/month) -4.31
1984 Exchange (%) 32.20
Exchange (S/month) 7.48
Interexchange Non-traffic Sensitive (S/month) -7.47
1985 Exchange (%) 47.30
Exchange (S/month) 10.98
Interexchange Non-traffic Sensitive (S/month) -10.97
1986 Exchange (%) 64.40
Exchange (S/month) 14.93
Interexchange Non-traffic Sensitive (S/month) -14.93
Dollars are current dollars.
1981-1986 Annual Growth in Exchange Revenue Requirement per
Local Subscriber due to Divestiture (%/year) 7.90
Source: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFOR-
MATION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF BELL SYS-
TEM REVENUE REQUIREMENTS, scenarios 2.1 and 6.1 (1982)
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Table 4


















7.72 8.25 6.87 7.72 8.25 6.87
15.65 17.65 12.78 7.75 8.74 12.77
10.75 11.05 2.79 7.84 8.15 3.82
31.84 33.75 6.00 6.78 9.85 45.28
12.95 14.95 15.44 12.95 14.95 15.44
12.30 12.20 -.81 8.60 8.55 -0.58
10.65 11.86 11.36 7.87 8.80 11.82
12.48 18.43 47.68 10.02 15.77 57.39
10.60 n/a 0.00 7.30 n/a 0.00
12.55 16.48 31.31 6.19 9.57 54.60
Source: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFOR-
MATION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF STATE TELEPHONE REGU-
LATORY DATA, Tables D and E (1984).
Table 5




















16.05 17.15 6.85 16.05 17.15 6.85
34.09 38.44 12.76 17.73 19.54 10.21
27.05 28.25 2.73 18.40 19.75 7.34
None None - 16.86 21.93 30.07
22.85 26.35 15.32 22.85 26.35 15.32
20.40 20.35 -0.25 20.40 20.35 -0.25
None None - 17.29 19.34 11.86
33.03 42.98 30.12 26.26 6.21 32.89
34.20 n/a 0.00 20.30 n/a 0.00
36.37 51.43 41.41 14.67 28.25 92.57
21.19
Source: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFOR-
MATION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF STATE TELEPHONE REGU-
LATORY DATA, Tables F and G (1984).
Not surprisingly, state regulators, who administered pre-divestiture pol-
icy, strongly resisted the local rate increases initiated by the newly
divested companies. This resistance reflected the unwillingness of consum-
ers to accept the large and abrupt local price increases associated with
divestiture. This grassroots resistance has undercut the new pricing policy.
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changes in producer price indices for both local and long-distance service
(see Table 6). Local service prices increased by substantially more than
the rate of inflation. Interstate long-distance rates decreased slightly as a
result of FCC regulatory action following divestiture.66
Table 6
Producer Price Indices - Selected Telephone Services
October 1983 January 1984 October 1984
Local Service 164.7 166.9 178.2
Residential* 170.5 173.3 184.4
Business 174.0 176.7 187.5
Toll Service 149.4 149.6 147.3
Intrastate MTS 152.3 152.9 158.9
Interstate MTS 153.4 153.4 145.6
Intrastate WATS 151.2 151.1 148.7
Interstate WATS 127.1 127.1 119.6
Private Lines
Interstate 156.9 158.4 158.4
Producer Price 245.4 247.0 248.8
Index**
(1972 = 100)
* The Producer Price Index for residential local service is a measure of the first transaction between
the provider or service and the consumer. Telephone services contained in the Consumer Price Index
cover not only local residential service, but also parts of toll service, equipment leasing (such as exten-
sion phones), and non-recurring charges (such as installation).
** For total finished goods.
Source: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PRODUCER PRICES AND PRICE
INDEXES, Oct. 1983, Jan. 1984, Oct. 1984.
Although telephone rates generally did not fall as predicted, the quality
of service manifestly deteriorated, especially in the putatively competitive
long-distance market. AT&T reported to the FCC in late January 1984
that orders for private line service were backing up. The normal monthly
carry-over swelled from 3,000 to 11,500 unfilled orders, and the wait re-
quired to obtain Wide-Area Telephone Service (WATS) lines rose from
eleven to twenty-two days.6 7 By August, backlog and delay problems had
worsened, with more than 40,000 private line orders in the month-to-
month carry-over.68 AT&T subsequently explained that rapid intracorpo-
rate procedures before divestiture had necessarily been supplanted "by a
more formal method" between AT&T and the now independent BOCs,
66. See supra note 61.
67. Letter from D.J. Culkin, Corporate Vice-President, AT&T, to Jack D. Smith, Chief, FCC
Common Carrier Bureau (Jan. 27, 1984).
68. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, AT&T COMMUNICATIONS 1984 SERVICE ORDER
PROVISIONING (Sept. 1984).
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and that service quality consequently suffered."9 Moreover, consumer sat-
isfaction with service declined as uncertainty about who was responsible
for service quality grew." Disruption of expanded AT&T offerings sub-
jected the long-distance service market to the shock of zero growth in the
face of rising demand.' The FCC-mandated decrease in AT&T long-
distance prices, when adjusted for service delays and zero growth, proba-
bly left the long-distance consumer no better off than before divestiture.
B. The Impact of Divestiture on Key Participants
Regulators, politicians, and the public recoiled from divestiture, which,
in the name of fostering "competition" and "efficiency," caused prices to
increase and seemingly intractable operating and pricing problems to ma-
terialize in an industry previously famous for rendering the world's finest
telephone service. These developments, while not totally unexpected, went
considerably beyond adjustments that divestiture proponents had acknowl-
edged were likely to occur. None of the four major actors involved in the
divestiture secured quite as much as expected, while some got considerably
less.
AT&T was among the losers. It had relatively clear goals it hoped to
achieve through divestiture: freedom from the revenue transfer claims of
the BOCs, and the promise of partial, if not total, deregulation of its long-
distance service offerings. A year after divestiture, however, AT&T found
itself still financially obligated to the BOCs for revenue transfers consti-
tuting sixty percent of AT&T's operating expenses, with no indication
that it will be able to relinquish its role as the principal financial sup-
porter of local telephone service." Furthermore, AT&T remains as sub-
ject to FCC review processes today as it had been during the previous ten
years; virtually none of the structural constraints on AT&T, imposed by
the FCC based on the need to regulate monopoly, have been removed.
The mixed results for AT&T are reflected in the modest gains of its
shareholders since divestiture. Under the divestiture plan, each ten shares
of the old AT&T was converted into ten shares of the new AT&T plus
69. Stuart, AT&T Sees Backlog Till Early '85, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1984, at DI, col. 3.
70. See, e.g., Maremont, Did It Make Sense To Break Up AT&T?, BUS. WK., Dec. 3, 1984, at
86, 88; Baker, Wired for Slumber, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1984, at A27 ("the [telephone] bill has re-
cently become so complicated that you need a doctorate in telephone-bill interpretation to make any
sense of it").
71. Romano, Telecommunications Regulation and the Realities of a Competitive Marketplace,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 22, 1984, at 41, 44. See generally O'Reilly, AT&T: What Was It We Were
Trying to Fix?, FORTUNE, June 11, 1984, at 30; Maremont, supra note 70, at 88.
72. See AT&T Emergency Petition, FCC Docket No. 78-72 (filed Feb. 27, 1984). See also C.
Brown, Remarks before the New York Society of Security Analysts 7 (Dec. 11, 1984) (on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation).
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one share in each of the seven regional holding companies.7" A share of
the new AT&T stock traded for $17.88 immediately upon divestiture and
traded for $19.50 one year later. 7' As shown in Table 7, the total return,
including dividends and capital appreciation, on shares of the new AT&T
was significantly lower than that on the Dow Jones Utilities Index.
Likewise, the BOCs have not reaped the benefits of divestiture that
their managements might have expected. Because court-imposed restric-
tions on the scope of BOC activity persist, the companies, far from being
independent of AT&T, remain heavily dependent on it as the source of
revenues needed to maintain local rate subsidies. 75 Even so, shares of the
new regional holding companies fared better than new AT&T shares.
These shares returned thirty-two percent at a time when the average re-
turn on Dow Jones Utilities was twenty-four percent (see Table 7). In-
vestors evidently perceived the BOCs as possessing sufficient short-term
income-generating opportunities to secure coverage of their local service
costs. 76
73. What Happens to AT&T Stockholders, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 28, 1983, at 70.
74. DAILY STOCK PRICE RECORD, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, Oct.-Dec. 1983, at 24; Oct.-
Dec. 1984, at 25.
The stock price of AT&T during the period prior to and after divestiture reflected gains caused by
several events: the initial settlement of the DOJ's antitrust suit, the MCI decision, MCI Telecommu-
nications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), and release
of the final divestiture plan and the Access Charges decision. In August 1982, when the settlement of
the AT&T case was approved by the court, AT&T's stock had a total return of 11.0%. Based on our
calculations using the "market model", with a value-weighted index of all the stocks on the NYSE as
the market portfolio, we would have expected AT&T to have had a return of only 6.0% at that time.
The MCI antitrust case decision was overturned in January 1983, a month with a return of 16.6% in
contrast with an expected return of 1.6%. The settlement of the the final divestiture plan and the FCC
Access Charges ruling in August 1983 resulted in a return of 7.8% when the expected return was
0.6%. The announcement of the consent decree was also viewed as good news; the five day return of
AT&T around the announcement date was 3.0%, which is significantly larger than the expected
return of -1.5%. These significant positive returns suggest that analysts viewed the divestiture-related
events which provoked them as favorable to the company.
After divestiture, the total return on new AT&T shares over 1984 was 15.8.%. This return includes
gains due to events unrelated to the company's performance. In May 1984, AT&T had a return of
10.5% (expected return = -2.5%), which coincided with the FCC decision to allow AT&T to pay
lower rates for local hook-ups and AT&T's decision to buy back $100 million of its own shares. In
July 1984, when Judge Greene issued his ruling barring the BOCs from offering long-distance ser-
vices, AT&T had a return of 4.4% (expected return = .3%).
For a discussion of the "market model", see E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE
267-320 (1972).
75. Prior to divestiture, some $12.5 billion of interstate long-distance revenues were distributed to
the nation's 1500 local telephone companies, H.R. REP. NO. 479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983). The
traditional division of revenue arrangements continued for some time after divestiture, but was con-
verted late in 1984 to contracts between AT&T and the BOCs. For a discussion of some of the plans
intended to replace this revenue stream, see infra text accompanying notes 84-96.
76. The higher than average return was a result of the increased stock prices of the regional
holding companies; the actual 1984 dividend returns of these companies fell short of those of the Dow
Jones Utilities, as shown in Table 7.
AT&T Divestiture
Table 7
1984 Telephone Company Stock Performance
(per share rate of return)
Dividend Price Total
Yield (%) Change (%) Return (%)
AT&T 6.71 9.09 15.80
Regional Holding
Companies
Ameritech 9.30 18.99 28.29
Bell Atlantic 9.81 23.18 32.99
Bellsouth 9.26 21.07 30.33
NYNEX 9.76 20.73 30.49
Pacific Telesis 9.73 24.10 33.83
Southwestern Bell Corp. 9.51 20.17 29.68
USWest 9.71 26.74 36.45
Dow Jones Utilities 10.48 13.41 23.89
Source: DAILY STOCK PRICE RECORD, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, Oct.-Dec. 1983, at 1, 21, 24,
53, 54, 320, 335, 409, 456; Oct.-Dec. 1984, at 1, 22, 25, 53, 54, 319, 335, 410, 457.
The strong stock market performance of the BOCs and the concomitant
weak performance of AT&T is not consistent with some earlier forecasts:
most analysts, including the authors, saw a new, leaner AT&T surging
forward as a major growth company while the BOCs languished as wire
and cable connection providers with typical or below average public utility
returns.7 7 These forecasts were based on the assumption that revenue
transfers from long-distance to local service would be eliminated, a devel-
opment regulators have been unwilling to permit.
It is unclear whether the Department of Justice has achieved its origi-
nal goals through divestiture. The DOJ, in proposing divestiture, said
that it was seeking to accelerate competition and deregulation throughout
the telecommunications industry. Neither has occurred to date. Although
it is difficult to evaluate whether the antitrust policies pursued by the
DOJ will in the long run produce a competitive, healthy telephone indus-
try, the first year of divestiture showed remarkably little progress toward
this end. In fact, the Antitrust Division has found itself serving increas-
ingly as a regulator of the BOCs, and together with the judgment court,
as ultimate arbiter of developments in the telecommunications industry. 8
The public was promised more efficient pricing and expanded choice of
telephone services from divestiture. It has instead received price increases
across the board, with the exception of the FCC-mandated cut in AT&T
77. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 31-39; see also Schwartz, Stacked Competition
and Phony Deregulation for AT&T: The Proposed Telecommunications Competition and Deregula-
tion Act of 1981, 3 COMM/ENT 411 (1981).
78. See infra text accompanying note 126; see also United States v. Western Electric Co., 592 F.
Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
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prices, and considerable service disruption. Consumers who rarely, if ever,
gave any thought to telephone matters have, as a result, brought increased
pressure to bear on the Congress and, in the process, heightened the level
of direct government intervention in the telecommunications market.79
C. Understanding What Went Wrong
Divestiture, which was supposed to benefit both consumers and AT&T,
has in the short run benefited neither. This failure is the result of miscal-
culations by the judgment court, AT&T, and the DOJ regarding pricing
in the telephone industry. These parties failed to realize that simply alter-
ing ownership by divestiture, without addressing the fundamentals of
pricing policy, was almost certain not to yield effective competition in the
long-distance telephone market. Focusing solely on ownership, they ig-
nored the strong commitment of state regulators to maintaining low local
rates with revenues received from long-distance service.
In the first year the decree was in effect, state regulators, and the public
they served, resisted the local rate increases required by the new structure
of the telecommunications industry. These regulators, still working for the
pre-divestiture policy of low local rates, continued to divert AT&T's long-
distance revenues to cover costs that otherwise would have required rate
increases. Such diversion prevented long-distance rates from falling and
thus to some extent prevented AT&T from operating as an effective com-
petitor in the rapidly developing long-distance market.
The DOJ misapprehended the reasons why local telephone companies
discriminated between AT&T and the OCCs when providing local ex-
change access and call distribution. That discrimination resulted from
straightforward revenue considerations-the higher charges that AT&T
paid to the operating companies-rather than any invidious anti-competi-
tive scheme. Having incorrectly labeled the discriminatory conduct as
predatory, the DOJ failed to recognize the conflict between the resulting
revenue flows implied by the restructuring of AT&T and those required
by the industry's traditional regulatory pricing goals.
The goals of AT&T, Justice, and the judgment court were blocked by
too narrow a view of the relevant factors. Opening long-distance markets
to competitive entry destroyed the old regulatory framework in which
long-distance operations supported local service prior to the decree. Di-
vestiture served to balkanize the telephone industry at a time when the
forces of technology and competition were blurring traditional product
and service lines. Following divestiture the telecommunications industry
79. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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has required almost constant regulatory oversight by the judgment court.
This oversight is itself a form of government intervention, and is inimical
to the sought-after "competitive" and "deregulated" telephone industry
which divestiture was supposed to allow.
III. Necessary Steps to Improve Local and Long-Distance Telephone
Operations
Breaking up AT&T was a mistake. To undertake such a disruptive
reformation of market structure without fully addressing industry pricing
policies was a failure of process. But that mistake cannot be undone. It is
unrealistic at this point to contemplate reconstitution of a single, inte-
grated Bell Telephone System. The focus, therefore, must be on rectifying
the more egregious problems resulting from divestiture.
Many of the problems resulting from divestiture are amenable to im-
provement, which can be achieved by focusing on a set of consistent policy
goals. These goals should include: (1) stabilizing local telephone rates
while sustaining the local operating companies, (2) removing inefficient
constraints on the activities of the operating companies, (3) establishing
competition for local service where economically justified, and (4) deregu-
lating the new AT&T. But these are stopgap measures; in the long-run,
Congressional action is needed in order to implement a comprehensive
telecommunications plan. Only through the legislative process can a work-
able compromise among competing institutional objectives be achieved.
A. Seeking to Stabilize Local Telephone Rates
The price of local residential telephone service remains a topic of over-
riding political sensitivity. Any attempt to alleviate the problems resulting
from divestiture must therefore'take into account the possibility of con-
gressional intervention. Two parallel initiatives are needed in order to sta-
bilize local rates while sustaining the revenue generating capacities of the
BOCs. First, access charges paid by AT&T and the OCCs must be equal-
ized to reduce AT&T's incentive to bypass local networks. Second, the
BOCs should be permitted to develop non-local revenue sources indepen-
dent of AT&T and the OCCs.
Divestiture jeopardized the flow of funds which had sustained local op-
erations while local companies charged artificially low local rates. Imme-
diately prior to divestiture, the Bell System had assets in the range of
$130 billion.80 Between two-thirds and three-quarters of those assets were
80. This number represents telephone plant assets net of accumulated depreciation. AMERICAN
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, Financial Section, 8, 26-28 (1984); see also
MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 20.
Yale Journal on Regulation
sunk in local telephone plant, but local service prices generated less than
half of the annual revenue requirement associated with that local invest-
ment.81 The balance of the annual revenue requirement was recovered
through "contributions" from inter- and intrastate toll operations.8" After
divestiture these contributions continued in the form of differential access
charges paid by AT&T and the OCCs to the BOCs. However, such ac-
cess charges represent an unstable source of revenues because common
carriers can bypass local networks and avoid the charges.8"
The FCC's first Access Charges decision contained a proposal for re-
placing the potential revenue shortfall confronting the BOCs.8 ' Under this
plan, a four dollar to six dollar end-user access charge (per line per
month) was to be levied on all telephone subscribers.8 The FCC plan
would have shifted much of the burden for covering common costs away
from the long distance carriers (and major business users who constitute
their principal customers) to local subscribers. This plan was not intended
to be a source of widespread price increases.86 But coming on the heels of
the substantial local rate increase requests already filed by the BOCs, end-
user access charges were seen by the public as simply another effort to
increase consumer telephone prices.8"
The House of Representatives responded to public pressure by passing
legislation prohibiting such end-user access charges; the Senate nearly
passed a similar measure, delaying the imposition of such charges, in early
81. See MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1 at 19-21; AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH,
supra note 80, Financial Section, at 2, 26.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 1091.
83. Bypass is a process through which a telephone user connects directly to a long-distance com-
pany or to the location being called (via a private line) without going through the BOC. This practice
is only economical for very heavy long-distance users, so the BOC is deprived of a significant amount
of revenue which it would have received by transporting the call from its network to the network of
the long-distance carrier. Examples of bypass technologies include roof-top antennae, fiber-optic two-
way cable and cellular mobile radio link-ups to the inter-exchange facilities of a common carrier. See
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at Dl; Ordover & Willig, Local Telephone Pricing in a Competitive
Environment, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW 267, 270 (E. Noam
ed. 1983). See also Weber, AT&T is Shaping Local Bypass Aid, BUS. WK., Jan. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
84. In re MTS and WATS Market Structure (Access Charge Order), 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (1983),
53 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 479, modified on reconsid., 48 Fed. Reg. 42,984, 54 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F)
615 (1983), further modified on reconsid. 49 Fed. Reg. 7810, 55 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 785 (1984),
afrd in part, remanded in part sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 737
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3599 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
85. 48 Fed. Reg. at 42,986-90, 53 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) at 516-17, 560; 54 RAD. REG. 2D (P &
F) at 619-26.
86. Cf. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,984, 42,986; 54 RAD. REG. 2D (P &
F) 615, 619-20 (1983); Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983: Joint Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1983) (testimony of FCC Chairman Mark Fowler).
87. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. H9662 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Gore).
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1984.88 Faced with this congressional reaction, the FCC adopted a revised
access plan calling for a maximum end-user charge of $2.35 phased in
over a two-year period commencing in June 1985.89 Each dollar in end-
user charges yields approximately $1 billion annually.9" The revised FCC
plan will produce $2.40 billion in annual revenues for local telephone
companies while reducing the amount paid to them by toll carriers by a
like amount. Because the annual revenue required to cover joint and com-
mon costs is between $10 and $13 billion,91 local exchange companies will
still require substantial subsidy payments.
The settlement decree required that common carrier access charges be
"nondiscriminatory" and "cost-based." 92 However, under the present sys-
tem, AT&T continues to pay charges that are more than twice as large as
those paid by the OCCs.93 While it is true that AT&T receives premium
"Feature Group D" service, while its competitors receive inferior "Fea-
ture Group B" service,94 the superior service it currently receives does not
justify the substantial and disproportionate cost burden AT&T must
bear.95 In addition, it is unclear whether the deep discount now enjoyed
by the OCCs will disappear once "equal interconnection," as defined by
the consent decree, is achieved. The OCCs may argue that an access
charge differential should be maintained until full, universal interconnec-
tion is established. The decree explicitly provides for waivers in the case
of small central exchange offices, so that universal interconnection may not
be achieved before the turn of the century. 96
88. H.R. 4102, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H9686 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983), which
would have prohibited end-user access charges, passed the House on Nov. 10, 1983. See 129 CONG.
REC. H9701 (daily ed.). In view of the House action, the FCC on Jan., 25, 1984, voted to postpone
and reconsider its Access Charges decision. Memorandum Opinion & Order on Further Reconsidera-
tion, 49 Fed. Reg. 7810 (1984). The following day, the Senate narrowly (44 to 40) passed a resolution
tabliag.legislation similar to the House measure then pending. 130 CONG. REC. S211 (daily ed. Jan.
26, 1984).
89. See Recommended Decision & Order by the Federal-State Joint Board, MTS and WATS
Market Structure, FCC Docket No. 78-72 (Nov. 23, 1982), adopted, FCC Mimeo No. 84-637, 50
Fed. Reg. 940 (1985).
90. Authors' estimate.
91. Authors' estimate.
92. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 233. See also United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 569 F. Supp. at 1067.
93. The actual discount for OCCs is now 55%. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 54.
94. For a description of the different types of "Feature Group" services, see TELEFOCUS, Jan.
1985, at 7.
95. AT&T has maintained, for example, that simply because it purchases one category of local
exchange service at one end of a circuit, it need not necessarily purchase the same category at the
other end of the circuit. In other words, it can use the costly "Feature Group D" service at an
originating end and the less expensive "Feature Group B" service at the terminating end. As the firm
argued in 1984 to the FCC, "The [BOCs] cannot rely on claimed differences in originating access as
justification for charging AT&T over twice what other carriers are charged for the distinct, and con-
cededly identical, terminating access element." See TELECOM. REP., Sept. 10, 1984, at 4.
96. The decree ostensibly covers all BOC central offices, but provides for waivers in the case of
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If such discrimination in access charges continues, AT&T is likely to
seek less costly alternatives to continued use of BOC local exchange sys-
tems." The advantages enjoyed by the OCCs under the prevailing system
are largely responsible for the loss in AT&T's market share and their
rapid growth. Between 1982 and 1983, AT&T revenues increased from
$24.98 billion to $26.13 billion, but its competitors, with their share of the
market expanding from 4.8% to 8.4%, increased revenues from $2.4 bil-
lion to $3.82 billion.98 AT&T can stabilize its market share only by pric-
ing toll offerings closer to cost. This pricing change cannot occur if
AT&T continues to bear the major burden of supporting local rates.
A major threat to BOC revenues exists because AT&T and the OCCs
can avoid access charges by establishing direct links to customers." The
concentration of demand for toll calling in a few large business users
offices without stored program switches or serving fewer than 10,000 access lines. United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 233. It is estimated that about 60% of central offices (serving about 40% of
subscribers) fall into this category. The recent GTE-Sprint antitrust consent decree applies an equal
interconnection obligation on GTE telephone companies. See United States v. GTE Corp., 1984-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,355 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1985). No such obligation applies to other telephone
companies.
97. One option open to AT&T is to select the cheaper "Feature Group B" interconnection service
which its competitors use. On Aug. 15, 1984, AT&T petitioned the Texas Public Utility Commission
requesting that it order Southwestern Bell to provide AT&T with this service, which AT&T main-
tained was identical to the "Feature Group D" AT&T currently employs. AT&T maintained the
swap would save it about $180 million annually in reduced local exchange costs. TELECOM REP.,
Aug. 20, 1984, at 1. Southwestern Bell countered by seeking an FCC order directing AT&T to
continue to subscribe to the premium local interconnection service. TELECOM. REP., Aug. 27, 1984, at
3. AT&T ultimately withdrew the proposal. This controversy indicates the increasing tension between
AT&T and the BOCs, and the growing reluctance of the former to serve as the chief financial support
for the latter.
98. Reply Comments of AT&T, Appendix B, Schedule 1 at 182, In re Long Run Regulation of
AT&T's Basic Domestic Interstate Services, FCC Docket No. 83-1147 (filed June 4, 1984).
99. Two types of bypass may raise problems: bypass of the interexchange system and bypass of
related services, such as billing. At present, AT&T is exploring alternative billing arrangements,
evidently because the charges of the BOCs are considered excessive. AT&T, for example, has under-
taken a direct billing experiment in Minnesota and may follow the same tack in other states. See
TELECOM. REP., Nov. 26, 1984, at 8-9. Initially, parties complained that permitting AT&T and the
BOCs to engage in joint billing was anticompetitive and would afford AT&T a cost advantage. See
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 198-99. Billing costs are a major AT&T cost
factor, particularly given the large volume of low volume toll customers the firm now serves. As
AT&T has stated:
This can be illustrated by the economics of a customer who makes one interstate long dis-
tance call in a month. Such a customer typically speaks for seven minutes and generates about
$1.70 in revenues. AT&T, however, incurs $2.80 in costs as a result of that one call. Fully 85
percent of these costs are the externally imposed costs of billing and access charges. An average
of 85 cents of the costs reflect costs of bill rendering and account administration, fixed costs
that are incurred whether the customer makes one or many calls. AT&T is able to recover
these fixed costs only from higher-volume customers who generate sufficient revenues to cover
these 'up front' costs.
Comments of AT&T at 47 & n.1, In re Long-Run Regulation of AT&T's Basic Domestic Interstate
Services, FCC Docket No. 83-1147 (Apr. 2, 1984). The establishment of local distribution facilities
independent of the BOCs is another means by which AT&T could potentially reduce its operating
costs.
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makes bypass of local distribution facilities profitable on an individual ba-
sis when access charges are high.' 00 Given the disproportionately large
contributions to local rates associated with AT&T's toll traffic, even rela-
tively limited bypass by AT&T could mean a substantial reduction in
local telephone revenues. A major reduction in BOC revenues would force
state regulators to approve local subscriber price increases if the BOCs are
to remain viable over the long-run.
The FCC, with the support of the Justice Department, should direct
that the present access charge discount enjoyed by the OCCs be eliminated
once equal interconnection, as defined by the consent decree, is achieved.
Furthermore, as soon as each BOC central office is converted to equal
access, the carrier access charges associated with that office should be the
same for all toll carriers.
The FCC should also take steps to ensure that the superior categories
of interconnection which the decree requires are, in fact, used by the com-
petitive carriers. The decree explicitly gives the OCCs the option of con-
tinuing to use inferior grades of interconnection and paying lower access
charges.' These carriers have demonstrated that it is possible to make
considerable profits without equal interconnection, because after adjusting
for quality differentials their prices are still lower than those of AT&T.
Given that the decree requires the BOCs to make substantial, costly alter-
ations in their plant to accomodate equal interconnection, °102 access charges
should be set at levels which reflect only the added costs of higher quality
connections. If they are not set at this level, and the OCCs are free not to
purchase the expanded interconnection services, an obvious potential for
underutilized local plant exists which would exacerbate the BOC's al-
ready poor prospects for generating revenue. If equal interconnection is
the means of ensuring effective competition in the long-distance communi-
cations market, either price differentials among carriers must be cost-
based or the option to purchase inferior local interconnection services must
be eliminated.
It is essential that both the access charge differentials and the base
levels be set correctly. A rational pricing system, involving cost-based ac-
cess charges for the use of local exchange networks, is necessary to remove
100. See G. BROCK, BYPASS OF THE LOCAL EXCHANGE: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 37 (1984)
(FCC Office of Plans & Policy Working Paper Series No. 12).
101. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 233.
102. In July 1983, AT&T estimated that it would cost the BOCs $73 million to reconfigure their
networks and $2.47 billion to provide equal access. See United States v. Western Elec., 569 F. Supp.
at 1066. The decree provides that AT&T must reimburse the BOCs for whatever costs the BOCs
cannot otherwise recover, but the preliminary accounting in this regard is not to take place until
January 1, 1989. Equal access, however, is to be provided in virtually all offices by September 1986.
See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 233.
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the incentive for common carriers to bypass these networks. But the
charges that will be imposed on common carriers under the FCC's revised
access charge plan are not cost-based. For example, the FCC plan envi-
sions that a portion of the charges paid by toll carriers will be distributed
as subsidy payments to rural telephone companies in order to minimize
local rate shocks."08 Such subsidy payments may effectuate a regulatory
policy to keep prices low, but they do not qualify as costs under the "cost-
based" requirement contained in the consent decree.1°4
Access charges which are not cost-based represent an unstable source of
revenues, except in areas where scale economies are so great as to prohibit
bypass. High access charges will encourage economically inefficient invest-
ments by the common carriers. Carriers will establish bypass connections
because of high access charges even when local networks could provide
connections at a lower marginal cost.
103. Under the FCC's "High Cost Fund" proposal, long-distance carriers would pay, in effect, a
surcharge on the local exchange access charges they pay. The funds would be pooled and then dis-
bursed to telephone companies whose costs exceed designated limits. See MTS-WATS Market Struc-
ture, FCC Docket No. 78-72; Joint Board Recommendations, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,325, 57 RAD. REG. 2D
(P & F) 267, 284 (released Nov. 23, 1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 67). Under this latest plan
about $427 million would have been collected from the long-distance carriers, and disbursed almost
exclusively to small, independent telephone companies. 49 Fed. Reg. at 48,335. The FCC adopted the
Joint Board's November recommendations in December. FCC Mimeo 84-637, 50 Fed. Reg. 939
(1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 67, 69).
104. What constitutes "cost-based" pricing under the antitrust laws and under FCC regulation is
not the same. Simply because the charges placed on toll carriers are approved by the FCC under the
1934 Communications Act does not make those charges "cost-based" for the purpose of enforcing the
consent decree. There is, of course, an elaborate literature regarding "cost" which has developed
under the Robinson-Patman Act and related laws. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968,
1968 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. REP. 131; P. AREEDA, 1982 ANTITRUST LAW 153 (Supp. 1982). The
judgment court has stated it does not wish to "precipitate a conflict between the agency's [FCC's]
responsibilities and a court judgment." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 656.
What cost standard will apply remains unclear. See Lavey & Carlton, supra note 7, at 1507 &
n.58. The possibility of some conflict was raised in correspondence early in 1983 between Justice and
the FCC. TELECOM. REP., Jan. 24, 1983, at 3. Recently, the FCC stated on this issue that:
Simply put, the tension that is poised between the Commission's existing access charge rules
for Dedicated and Common Transport and the provisions of the MFJ with respect to equal
charges per unit of traffic delivered or received, is whether the Commission should impose its
cost based pricing requirements upon interexchange carriers that access the Bell Operating
Companies prior to the expiration date of the equal charges per unit of traffic delivered or
received provision of the Modification of Final Judgment (552 F. Supp. at 233-34).
Although we believe that our Dedicated and Common Transport access charges rules are
probably the correct long term solution we also recognize that the "equal charges" provision of
the MFJ is an integral component of the provisions that were contemplated by the parties
thereto, as well as by the reviewing Court. While the applicable provision of the Communica-
tions Act are not, as a matter of law, displaced either by the MFJ or the U.S. District Court's
determinations with respect thereto, we believe that it is desirable to afford parties an opportu-
nity to submit comments.
MTS-WATS Market Structure, Phase I, FCC Docket No. 78-72, FCC Mimeo 84-604, 8-9, 50 Fed.
Reg. 939 (1985).
The issue of which regime governs-that of the FCC or the consent decree-most likely will arise
when toll carriers, such as AT&T, challenge local carrier charges, much as AT&T has already tenta-
tively done in Texas. See supra note 97.
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While cost-based access charges are being established, additional
sources of BOC revenue should be developed to help stabilize local rates.
As discussed in the next section, the BOCs can develop alternative revenue
sources if they are permitted to diversify into other markets, including the
long-distance services market. Until cost-based pricing is established, lim-
ited restrictions on common carrier bypass of local networks may be
required. 106
B. Removing Constraints on the Permissible Activities of the
Operating Companies
The judgment court has asserted that the BOCs are most properly con-
fined to providing local telephone services. Under the decree, the BOCs
were excluded from the interstate long-distance communications market
and from most other competitive markets." 6 The court rejected recent
proposals by the BOCs to offer new, unregulated services domestically
and to market products overseas.'0 7 It has defended its "containment" pol-
icies by arguing that BOC diversification could lead to predatory pricing
and cross-subsidization, place burdens on basic service, and distract BOC
management from fulfilling its obligation to provide equal interconnection
as required by the court decree.' 08
The decree provided that the BOCs may diversify into new geographic
areas and product lines upon a showing that there will be no anticompeti-
tive effect on the "target market" involved.' 9 However, the July 1984
decision of the judgment court established an elaborate waiver review pro-
cess for approval of new BOC activities." 0 One BOC has appealed this
105. One alternative to restricting bypass while retaining non-cost-based access charges would be
to set access charges closer to cost for interconnections to high volume end-users. See Ordover &
Willig, supra note 83, at 281 (suggesting that it might be feasible to design access charges that de-
clined per unit as customer usage increases).
106. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. at 188-89.
107. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 870-72 (D.D.C. 1984).
108. As the Department of Justice contended in comments before Judge Greene:
The existence of more profitable ventures within the holding company family also could
result in a rational holding company taking increased earnings out of the BOCs and investing
in the more profitable unregulated ventures. In such a case, the existence of businesses estab-
lished under Section VIII (C) waivers could result in reduced investment in the BOCs as they
became "cash cows" to be milked in order to support unrelated activities. At the same time,
new business ventures have the potential to divert the attention of senior regional management
from the provision of regulated telephone service. The quality of regulated service could thus
diminish.
Memorandum of the United States Concerning Removal of Line of Business Restrictions Pursuant to
Section VIII(C) and Response to Motions of Bell Atlantic and BellSouth at 10, United States v.
AT&T, No. 82-0192, (D.D.C. filed Feb. 21, 1984). See also Western Elec. Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 66,121 at 66,275.
109. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225.
110. See Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 873-74 (D.D.C. 1984).
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decision on the grounds that it is tantamount to a unilateral modification
of the decree. The company contends that the court's speculations regard-
ing cross-subsidies, ratepayer burdens, delays, and the like are without
factual foundation."'
The practical effect of the court's protectionist approach is to shield
interstate telecommunications companies, including AT&T, from their
most likely potential competitors, the BOCs. Although the judgment court,
after many months of delay, ultimately approved several diversification
proposals filed by the BOCs," ' the burdensome regulatory process has
prevented the BOCs from responding rapidly to changing market condi-
tions and new customer demands.'
1 3
The court-imposed restrictions on the permissible activities of the BOCs
are difficult to reconcile with the consent decree's stated purpose of accel-
erating competition. Once equal interconnection is accomplished, existing
constraints on further diversification of the BOCs into toll markets should
be eliminated. The most lucrative telecommunications market today is the
long-distance services market, in which the BOCs already have a substan-
tial presence because they provide about half of total intrastate toll ser-
vice." 4 Of course, the profitability of the toll market could decline, given
the substantial amount of new capacity now being added by AT&T and
the OCCs. It could also fall if AT&T were permitted to price its services
more in line with its costs. Despite these possibilities, the BOCs should be
allowed to enter the long distance market. Any profits the BOCs derive
from such services will help maintain low local rates.
Even prior to equal interconnection, there is no sound public policy
reason for prohibiting the BOCs from providing toll services between local
markets in which they do not also have local telephone operations. For
example, Pacific Telesis (which provides local service in California and
Nevada) could compete in the New York-to-Washington toll market. In-
deed, prohibiting such competition in noncontiguous markets has a dis-
111. See Brief of Appellant US West, Inc., at 40, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 84-
5687 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 23, 1984).
112. The diversification proposals were referred to the DOJ with "safeguards and conditions".
See United States v. AT&T, 592 F. Supp. 846, 868, 873 (D.D.C. 1984).
113. See Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge to Solicitor General H. Rex Lee
(Apr. 2, 1984); Letter from Assistant Commerce Secretary David J. Markey to Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust J. Paul McGrath (Oct. 1, 1984) (letters on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
114. See supra note 53. Under the consent decree, the BOCs are permitted to transport telephone
traffic only between telephones located within a Local Access and Transport Area (LATA). BOCs
also provide access to inter-LATA long-distance carriers for telephone customers within a LATA.
The local Bell System is divided into 161 LATAs of varying size. The definition of a long-distance
call is determined by state regulatory agencies. Thus, intra-LATA calls handled by the BOCs include
both local and long-distance calls. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993-95
(D.D.C. 1983) (approving LATAs). See also MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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tinctly anti-competitive effect, because it shields AT&T and the other toll
carriers from both actual and potential competition.
The arguments which have been used to support regulatory constraints
on BOC activities make little sense. The notion that local telephone ex-
change operations somehow enable BOCs to establish illicit cross-subsidies
or engage in predatory pricing is difficult, perhaps impossible, to support
with facts. There is little evidence that basic exchange telephone rates in
the United States have been excessive by any measure. Precisely the oppo-
site is demonstrated by a study discussed in our first article.115 Local tele-
phone operations, standing alone, are by no reasonable measure a prime
potential source of funds for cross-subsidies; we suspect that few BOCs
today are even earning their allowed rates of return on their local
investments.
Constraining BOC activities can only lessen the likelihood that the
AT&T divestiture will yield tangible public dividends. One plausible, if
not anticipated, rationale for divestiture was that it created seven new po-
tential competitors to AT&T. If this potential is now suppressed, policy-
makers may find it increasingly difficult to explain to a skeptical public
why divestiture was necessary. If competition is desirable, all actual and
potential competitors should be afforded an opportunity to compete. The
geographic and product line constraints on the BOCs, therefore, should be
eliminated.
C. Establishing Competition for Local Service Where Economically
Justified
Underlying the consent decree was a misconception about the competi-
tive natures of the long-distance and local service markets. The long-
distance market was viewed as competitive, while it was assumed that
scale economies associated with the local service market rendered it a
"natural monopoly." In fact, at the time of the settlement, the long-dis-
tance service sector hardly conformed with most notions of a competitive
marketplace, and local telephone service did not constitute a "natural mo-
nopoly." 6 Competition existed at the local level between the BOCs and
115. MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 9 n.21 (study suggests that an unregulated tele-
phone company would have charged local rates that were twice those charged by AT&T in order to
compensate for rising operating costs).
116. Wash. Post, July 17, 1984, at 20, col. 3. See also Eldor & Sudit, Alternative Specifications of
Returns to Scale and Joint Estimation of Factor Demand and Production Functions in Telecommuni-
cations, 18 REV. BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH 15 (1982); Raj & Vinod, Bell System Scale Economies
Estimated from a Random Coefficients Model, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 247 (1982).
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other service providers. This competition, on the fringe of the traditional
switched-voice telephone business, has continued to grow."1 7
The level and intensity of competition among local distribution systems
are a function of the services demanded by major business users. Due to
substantial concentration in the demand for both long-distance and local
private line service at many business locations, new service offerings
which bypass local distribution networks are economically feasible." 8 Al-
though the consent decree prohibited the BOCs from entering the long-
distance market, it placed no constraints on AT&T entering the local traf-
fic distribution field." 9 The decree also did not limit the ability of firms,
such as cable television companies, to provide local facilities for certain
specialized purposes such as high-speed data communications. 2
In general, competition in local service markets should be encouraged.
The present Bell local telephone plant cannot efficiently handle certain
classes of message traffic, including some classes of data communications.
Local telephone plant, for example, is typically engineered to handle
messages averaging two minutes in duration. Data communications, how-
ever, usually involve very short messages averaging a few seconds, such as
those associated with credit card verifications, or very long messages, such
as those associated with remote access data processing and the retrieval of
information from computerized data banks. Accommodating such traffic
on local telephone plant requires additional switches, because switches are
used more often or are tied up for longer periods of time. Switching costs
ordinarily constitute about seventy percent of overall circuit costs; chan-
neling such classes of data traffic across the conventional local plant could
significantly increase operating costs.
Inefficient duplication of local exchange functions can be avoided if lo-
cal telephone companies are permitted to price their distribution services
in line with marginal costs. Marginal cost pricing would eliminate the
incentive for firms to enter select local exchange markets to skim away
profits which the BOCs currently generate to subsidize local telephone
117. See Pepper, Competition in Local Distribution: The Cable Television Industry, in UNDER-
STANDING NEW MEDIA: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION 147 (B.
Compaine ed. 1984).
118. See, e.g., G. BROCK, BYPASS OF THE LOCAL EXCHANGE: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT,
supra note 100.
119. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 171-73 (D.D.C. 1982).
120. The matter of actual and potential cable television competition with the telephone industry
arose recently in conjunction with passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-639). The bill did not resolve all of the
disputes regarding cable television competition with traditional telephone offerings, though it did ad-
dress certain regulatory jurisdictional issues. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4655, 4664-65.
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rates. The FCC's revised access charge plan, however, fails to facilitate
such cost-based pricing.
Once marginal cost pricing is established, even limited constraints on
the development of local distribution options should be unnecessary. If
competitive distribution systems can provide certain services at a lower
cost than that associated with conventional telephone plant, such systems
should be developed. Neither the BOCs nor the state regulatory agencies,
however, is likely to acquiesce in the expansion of local service options
absent some assurance that such an action will not jeopardize the primary
source of BOC revenues. The most promising way to alter the views of
BOC management and state regulators is to reduce the line-of-business
restrictions on diversification by the BOCs contemporaneously with the
expansion of local service competition. If the BOCs can generate revenues
from new business ventures they will have less need for protection from
competition in local markets.
D. Deregulating the "New" AT&T
Speaking after the announcement of the AT&T settlement, William F.
Baxter, the principal government architect of the consent decree, stated
that divestiture would permit total deregulation of a very important por-
tion of the telecommunications industry: namely, the long-distance opera-
tions of the new AT&T.12 ' He made the same argument in defending the
settlement before a congressional committee, when he declared that "I
foresee in the near future the potential for substantial deregulation of the
Long Lines function.'
'1 22
There is little doubt that the promise of government support for future
deregulation played a major role in inducing AT&T to agree to divesti-
ture. For several years prior to divestiture AT&T had actively sought
passage of legislation that would sanction deregulation of the firm's "ef-
fectively competitive" enterprises.' 23 In fact, such legislation, supported by
the Reagan Administration, passed the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly in the
fall preceding the announcement of the AT&T settlement. 2 4
The post-divestiture experience reveals major political resistance to such
deregulation. AT&T's long-distance services remain as subject to FCC
and state rate-of-return regulation as they were prior to divestiture. In
121. Joint Hearings, supra note 60, at 81 (testimony of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General).
122. Hearings, supra note 9, pt. 1, at 59 (testimony of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General).
123. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 77.
124. Trienens, Deregulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Status Report, 50 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 409, 423 (1982).
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addition, other AT&T operations, although not subject to rate regulation,
must be provided through a separate subsidiary under requirements im-
posed by the FCC's 1980 Second Computer Inquiry decision (Computer
I1.125
Policymakers have been reluctant to make commitments concerning the
possible relaxation of regulatory restictions on AT&T. The Justice De-
partment, in FCC proceedings following divestiture, actually argued
against AT&T deregulation, stating:
Total immediate deregulation, . . . is not appropriate. AT&T
continues to provide a variety of monopoly services, such as interna-
tional and certain intrastate toll services and, therefore, there is a
potential risk of inefficient cross-subsidization of interstate services if
AT&T is fully deregulated in interstate exchange services. More-
over, the need for the competitive interexchange carriers to install
capacity and the unavailability of equal access on a universal basis
gives AT&T continuing market power. The Commission should take
account of AT&T's continuing market power in fashioning its 1984-
1990 transition toward the removal of rate and facilities
regulation. 126
The FCC has indicated that an essential precondition to deregulation of
AT&T's long-distance services is the'achievement of equal interconnec-
tion. The FCC believes that competition can exist in interexchange ser-
vices, but only upon a "level playing field.' 12 7 Under this view AT&T
must be handicapped through rate regulation and unequal access charges
until equality of access to basic exchange hardware is achieved. Other-
wise, AT&T could price services at or below cost, driving its competitors
out of business.
However, continued regulation of AT&T's long-distance services has
tangible ill effects. It subsidizes the growth of the OCCs and thus creates
an artificial and unstable market structure. Current regulations have sus-
tained AT&T prices at higher than competitive levels and have inhibited
innovations in customer services. 128 The OCCs have benefited from these
regulations, which enable them to price their services just below the price
125. See Final Decision, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 [hereinafter cited as Computer II]; reconsid., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further
reconsid., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), afUd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v.
FCC, 693 F.2d 1982 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
126. See Comments of the U.S. Dept. of Justice at 2, In re Long Run Regulation of AT&T's
Basic Domestic Interstate Services, FCC Docket No. 83-1147 (filed Apr. 2, 1984).
127. See Patrick, On the Road to Telephone Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 6, 1984, at 19.
The author, Dennis R. Patrick, is a Commissioner of the FCC.
128. See Romano, supra note 71 at 41.
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umbrella which AT&T must set.129 Once equal interconnection is
achieved the traditional rate-of-return regulation governing AT&T's con-
ventional services should be removed and access charges should be equal-
ized. Deregulation of certain interstate services that already are competi-
tive, such as interstate private line services or interstate television
transmission services, should not await equal access.
If the regulatory restraints on AT&T are removed, the prices of tele-
phone services will move toward cost, forcing the OCCs to increase pro-
ductivity in order to compete with AT&T's scale economies. In the short-
run consumers will benefit from lower prices, a wider range of services,
and a higher level of technological innovation. In the long-run there is a
risk that the OCCs will be unable to survive and that AT&T will regain
its monopoly position in long-distance service.1 30 Even so, reentry oppor-
tunities would limit monopoly pricing; the prospects of sustained competi-
tion can be enhanced by permitting the BOCs to enter the long-distance
market.
In addition to regulations governing AT&T's basic telephone services,
the company remains subject to the constraints of Computer II. This FCC
decision deregulated the provision of both customer-premises telephone
equipment and computerized telecommunications services. AT&T can
only participate in these deregulated activities, however, through a "fully
separate" or "arm's length" subsidiary, a condition ostensibly designed to
minimize cross-subsidies flowing from regulated to unregulated endeavors.
The FCC adopted these restrictions before divestiture, when AT&T
was dominant in both toll and local telephone operations. Despite the fact
that divestiture shrunk AT&T to about the same size as IBM, and re-
moved its local exchange functions, the FCC rules persist.' 3' The elabo-
rate "separate subsidiary" requirements contained in the FCC rules im-
pose significant costs on AT&T, estimated to be more than $1 billion a
year.' 32 These costs impose an unwarranted burden upon AT&T's opera-
tions and reduce the level of innovation and price reductions that AT&T
might otherwise achieve.
If the FCC restrictions are lifted, AT&T's ability to subsidize its
129. Romano, supra note 71, at 43. See also G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 108-
09 (1968) (discussing the theory of umbrella pricing and the dominant firm).
130. MacAvoy & Robinson I, supra note 1, at 41.
131. The FCC has proposed ending the separate subsidiary requirements for the sale of telephone
equipment but has not indicated whether the restrictions on AT&T's computerized services should
remain. See Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
132. See Reply Comments of American Telephone & Telegraph, app. B at 3, In re AT&T Com-
pany Petition for Relief from Computer II Structural Separation Requirements, FCC File No. ENF
84-17 (Aug. 8, 1984). See also Equipment, Enhanced Services, and Cellular Communications Services
by the Bell Operating Companies, 49 Fed. Reg. 1190 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702),
aff'd sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984).
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equipment and computer operations would be no greater than that of sev-
eral of its competitors. For example, the Computer H rules are inapplica-
ble to GTE Service Corporation, despite that firm's extensive involvement
in local and long-distance operations as well as equipment manufactur-
ing."18 In fact, the FCC recently declared GTE's long-distance affiliate to
be "nondominant" and deregulated it.' 34 The restrictions are also inappli-
cable to IBM which, in addition to its strong basic position in the com-
puter business, recently acquired a leading U.S. supplier of telephone
equipment.' 35 IBM also owns a controlling interest in a long distance car-
rier which was recently deregulated along with GTE-Sprint." 6 AT&T
should be allowed to compete against these companies in both basic tele-
phone and enhanced services. Any resulting AT&T "dominance" through
lower prices would result from its scale advantages; there should be little
fear regarding the "predatory" expulsion of GTE or IBM.
The continued regulation of AT&T in both long-distance and data
processing markets acts as a form of institutionalized cartel management
by which the government calls for "competition" while simultaneously
handicapping the most able competitor. Under this mixed system, neither
the full scale economies of natural monopoly nor the efficient pricing
mechanisms of market competition are achieved. AT&T has cost advan-
tages that would lead to lower prices and larger volumes of service if put
to use in making service offerings. If these advantages are constrained by
regulation, such market effects cannot occur.
The difficulty of achieving any significant deregulation of AT&T has
been largely due to the realities of the political process. The net result of
the settlement was not to facilitate deregulation, but rather to reduce
AT&T to more politically manageable dimensions. 3 ' Through divestiture
133. The decision and order requiring enhanced services to be provided through separate corpo-
rate entities originally applied to AT&T and GTE. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 389, 474, recon-
sid., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980). GTE, however, was exempted from these requirements on reconsidera-
tion. 84 F.C.C.2d at 72.
134. In its Competitive Carriers ruling, the FCC removed most rate, service, and entry controls
from interstate carriers such as GTE Sprint. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competi-
tive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980). See
Baker & Baker, Antitrust and Communications Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL 1, 4 (1983).
135. This deregulation occurred contemporaneous with IBM's acquisition of Rolm Corp., the
leading noncarrier-affiliated U.S. telephone equipment supplier. See Schrage, IBM Seeks to Acquire
Rolm Corp., Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1984, at 71, col. 3.
136. Until recently, the FCC placed limitations on IBM's transactions with the Satellite Business
Systems consortium in which it had a one-third interest. See Satellite Business Systems, 62 F.C.C.2d
997, 1046 (1977), reh'g denied, 64 F.C.C.2d 872, 873 (1977). Recently, however, the FCC permitted
IBM to assume majority control of this enterprise, which provides "Skyline" and other interstate
communications services, and also effectively removed the restrictions on IBM's dealings with SBS.
Changes in Satellite Business Systems Structure, FCC Mimeo 84-589 (Nov. 28, 1984).
137. Critics of U.S. policy suggest that divestiture was sought to reduce the concentration of pri-
vate power that had characterized the integrated Bell System. In the words of one of the attorneys
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AT&T lost the substantial state-by-state regulatory agency support that it
had previously enjoyed in its dealings with the FCC. This support had
stemmed from AT&T's policy of transfering revenue from long-distance
to local companies. Unable to marshal the regional telephone companies
on its behalf, the new AT&T has been unable to obtain significant sup-
port for company policies in Washington.
Equally important, AT&T overestimated the degree of general Con-
gressional and executive office support that would be available for deregu-
lation in the post-divestiture environment. The company apparently be-
lieved that there was a substantial probability of ensuing rapid
deregulation. But not even the Department of Justice stepped forward to
advance this policy. Even if the DOJ had been willing to press consist-
ently for relaxation or elimination of regulatory constraints, such action
was not possible within the Department's limited jurisdiction. Having
been pervasively regulated for generations, AT&T was unable to move
into the open market, given the diversity and inconsistency of federal ac-
tions that have followed divestiture.
Conclusions
The AT&T settlement represents an overly ambitious effort by the fed-
eral judiciary to restructure a complex regulated industry. The courts do
not always constitute the optimal forum for addressing, much less soundly
resolving, complex regulatory issues. In the case of the AT&T settlement,
turning matters over to the court has created as many problems as it was
supposed to resolve. The court may have altered the industry's structure,
but it has not yet curbed the general political appetite for subsidized local
telephone service. The result thus far has been ad hoc political interven-
tion in an effort to accommodate the mutually exclusive goals of (court-
supported) cost-based prices and (congressionally and regulatorily sup-
ported) subsidized prices.
Given the results of the first year of divestiture, comprehensive action
by Congress is necessary to strike a workable balance between competitive
who filed the government case, "U.S. v. AT&T is as much about political control as economic
power." BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION COMMITTEE, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A RE-
PORT ON THE DILEMMA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE U.S.A. 32 (1983). These sentiments are
echoed in the court opinion approving the settlement:
The legislators who enacted the [antitrust laws] voiced concerns beyond the effects of an-
ticompetitive activity on the economy: they also greatly feared the impact of the large trusts on
the nation's political system, and they regarded the power of these trusts as an evil to be
eradicated . . . The telecommunications industry plays a key role in modern economic, social,
and political life . . . [I]t is antithetical to our political and economic system for this key
industry to be within the control of one company.
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 164-65.
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and regulatory goals. The legislative process has the virtue of involving all
parties, and, by so doing, producing a resolution that commands broader
acceptability. It should be a matter of indifference to Congress whether
necessary changes are consistent with, or contradict, the consent decree
which was, after all, a private agreement imposed on the industry by a
federal district court judge. New legislation should accomplish three
things: ensure stable local telephone rates; free the BOCs from artificial
agency and court constraints on their commercial opportunities, including
the ability to enter the long-distance telephone business once equal access
is accomplished; and, remove restrictions on AT&T's ability to compete.
There is no guarantee that such a package of changes would necessarily
make the reconstituted American telecommunications industry work bet-
ter. However, it would minimize the likelihood that, by simply continuing
the present ad hoc course of court and commission regulation, things will
get significantly worse.
